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The pirates of the Caribbean are back—not in another fantastical film, 
but in the litigation over the reach of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). For the 
first time since a wave of maritime predation in the Caribbean in the early 
nineteenth century, Supreme Court justices are seriously discussing the 
legal issues surrounding piracy. The crime has emerged as the test case for 
evaluating the major controversies about the reach of the ATS—namely, 
extraterritorial application and the existence of corporate liability. At oral 
argument in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., justices of all 
persuasions invoked piracy as a paradigm or precedent,1 as had the lower 
courts before them.2 When the Court surprisingly delayed its decision, and 
instead called for new briefing and argument on the extraterritorial scope of 
the statute, it became even clearer that the battle over the ATS would be a 
naval engagement;3 indeed, the briefs of the plaintiffs and numerous amici 
repeatedly refer to piracy as a paradigm.4 
This Article examines the questions before the Court in Kiobel: the 
relevance of “piracies”—in the Constitution and at sea—to 
extraterritoriality and corporate liability under the ATS. Much of the 
discussion of piracy law in ATS cases has been inaccurate or incomplete.5 
Furthermore, the new attention to piracy should—but as yet has not—direct 
attention to pirates’ very own constitutional provision, the Define and 
 
*  Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. 
1  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–24, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 
(U.S. argued Feb. 28, 2012) (Justice Breyer citing piracy as precedent for corporate liability) (link); id. 
at 21 (Chief Justice Roberts citing piracy as precedent against corporate liability). 
2  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 156 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J. dissenting) 
(suggesting absurdity in the idea that pirates could avoid civil liability through incorporation) (link); 
Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, reh’g denied, 642 F.3d 268, 270–71 (2011) (using piracy as precedent for non-
corporate remedies under the ATS) (link); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 
2011) (en banc) (using piracy as precedent to demonstrate the extraterritorial applicability of the ATS) 
(link); id. at 798 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (using piracy as a precedent to demonstrate that the ATS does 
not apply to torts occurring in other sovereign states). 
3  Coincidentally, this newfound relevance of piracy comes as federal courts struggle with the first 
criminal prosecutions of the offense in centuries. See, e.g., United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 
2012) (link). 
4  See, e.g., Petitioners’ Supplemental Opening Brief at 35, Kiobel, No. 10-1491 (link). 
5  In a particularly egregious example, the Ninth Circuit said that the ATS drafters may have had the 
Barbary Pirates in mind. See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 745. Yet those sea raiders were never thought to be 
actual pirates in violation of international law, as they acted under sovereign authority. They were never 
prosecuted for piracy, but rather treated as military enemies. They were described as “pirates” only as an 
insulting popular idiom. 
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Punish Clause,6 which contains implicit limits on extraterritorial and, in 
particular, universal jurisdiction over international offenses. 
Part I argues that the Constitution’s treatment of piracy limits one form 
of extraterritoriality, universal jurisdiction (so called “foreign-cubed” suits), 
to offenses, like piracy, that have been established as universally cognizable 
by the law of nations. It does not, however, allow Congress to extend 
universal jurisdiction to the many international offenses that have not risen 
to universal jurisdiction status in international law. Part II turns from 
constitutional limits to statutory interpretation and the applicability of 
presumptions against extraterritoriality. Supreme Court piracy cases show 
that even for universally cognizable offenses, Congress must explicitly 
indicate that it wishes to extend extraterritorial jurisdiction. Statutory 
references to international law do not make the presumption against 
extraterritoriality disappear. Part III examines what piracy law teaches 
about corporate liability, concluding that the civil remedies available 
against pirates make the piracy example inapposite to ATS corporate 
liability. Part IV briefly concludes. 
 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MAXIMUM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
A. A Middle Ground on Extraterritoriality 
The litigation and accompanying academic debate over the meaning 
and scope of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been a marvel of surprising 
ideological transpositions. It is usually liberals who support reading 
international principles into domestic law, while conservatives disfavor 
such importation. But on the issue of corporate liability—to generalize 
broadly—liberals have urged the Court to look to U.S. common law while 
suddenly cosmopolitan conservatives have favored the adoption of a rule 
from international law and practice. The game of jurisprudential Twister 
does not stop there. On the question of extraterritoriality, liberals tend to 
look to international law—which is home to the doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction—and conservatives tend to invoke the parochial presumption 
against extraterritoriality. Neither position is fully correct. There may be a 
place for extraterritoriality in ATS cases, but only in a much narrower class 
of cases than where it is currently applied.7 
 
6  See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (link). 
7  See also Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 
1080–91 (2011) (arguing that because international law supplies the rules of decision in ATS cases, the 
statute can apply extraterritorially when international law authorizes universal jurisdiction) (link); 
Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 
50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 272–75 (2009) (arguing that courts in ATS cases have improperly ignored 
whether the suits would fall under universal jurisdiction in international law) (link). 
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As this Part will show, what is at stake ATS in cases like Kiobel is not 
simple extraterritoriality, but full universality, a kind of extraterritoriality on 
stilts. Answering Kiobel’s territoriality question requires consideration of 
Congress’s power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies on the high 
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations,”8 the constitutional basis for 
the ATS (and for law treating piracy) as currently construed by the courts. 
As will be shown, this clause suggests that the Constitution only gives 
Congress the power to extend universal jurisdiction to things that clearly 
have that status in international law. 
 
B. Universality, Not Mere Extraterritoriality 
The issue of ATS’s geographic scope is widely described as one of 
extraterritoriality. Yet Kiobel is not about mere extraterritoriality. Even the 
most controversial and aggressive uses of extraterritoriality typically 
involve the regulation of American conduct abroad, or of foreign conduct 
that has substantial, targeted effects in the U.S.9 As a constitutional matter, 
Congress can always fall back on its Foreign Commerce power10 for 
authority to make such laws. ATS cases like Kiobel, however, involve suits 
by foreigners against foreigners for conduct that took place entirely abroad 
and has no particular effect on the U.S.11 For U.S. courts to assert 
jurisdiction over these “foreign-cubed”12 suits thus calls for an extreme 
version of extraterritoriality: universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction 
poses much greater problems than mere extraterritoriality; it raises the 
question of where the federal government—supposedly one of limited 
powers—gets the authority to regulate conduct with no domestic nexus, 
with federal courts sitting as little “world courts.” 
 
C. Universal Jurisdiction as a Constitutional Question 
1. Piracies vs. Other “Offenses” 
As noted in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,13 the last case in which the 
Supreme Court addressed the Alien Tort Statute, Founding era common law 
incorporated three “international offenses”piracy, assaults on 
ambassadors, and violations of safe conduct. Piracy occurs, by definition, 
 
8  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. (link). 
9  See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (applying the Sherman 
Antitrust Act to foreign conduct with expected domestic effects) (link). 
10  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
11  See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (link). 
12  See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 794 (9th Cir. 2011) (Bea, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(describing the first “foreign-cubed” securities class action to reach the Second Circuit) (link). 
13  542 U.S. 692 (2004) (link). 
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on the high seas, outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. Thus, Sosa reasoned, 
the First Congress must have assumed the ATS would provide a cause of 
action at least for those offenses. Moreover, the Court held, contemporary 
international law violations of similar stature could also be brought under 
the statute. Because piracy by definition took place outside the jurisdiction 
of the United States, proponents of foreign-cubed ATS suits argue that 
Sosa’s citing piracy as a paradigm ATS cause of action demonstrates that 
the statute applies extraterritorially. 
This argument draws the wrong inferences from piracy’s inclusion in 
the list of domestically cognizable international law offenses in the 
Founding Era. Piracy differed in significant ways from the other two 
offenses mentioned in Sosa, which limits its relevance in the ATS context. 
Piracy was not simply a violation of the law of nations. It was also—unlike 
the other two international wrongs mentioned Sosa—a universally 
cognizable offense.14 This was crucial to both its constitutional and its 
statutory treatment. Yet ATS cases try to extend this precedent to non-
universal jurisdiction cases. 
In addition, the difference in the international legal status of piracy and 
the other two offenses is reflected and cemented in Article I. The ATS is 
generally thought to draw on the power to “define and punish . . . Offences 
against the law of nations.”15 Yet ATS actions for piracy (of which there are 
none on record) would presumably involve the companion power, in the 
same clause, to define and punish “piracies . . . on the high seas.”16 Thus, 
whatever is jurisdictionally true of “piracy” need not be true of other 
“Offenses” that can be reached under the ATS: they derive from separate—
though related—Article I powers. 
Piracy is both a high seas felony and an offense against the law of 
nations. The Constitution’s singling out of piracy is striking and demands 
explanation because it creates a double-redundancy with the subsequent 
terms. Does anything make piracy different from other high seas felonies 
and international law offenses? Yes: piracy was the only universally 
cognizable offense at the Founding. Starting with this textual observation, 
prior scholarship has explained that “piracy” is singled out because of its 
singular feature—its jurisdictional consequences. Congress could punish 
piracy universally, but such power did not extend to other “Offenses.” At 
most, the Constitution only permits universal jurisdiction over other 
universally cognizable offenses in international law.17 
Thus, the same provisions that empowers Congress to selectively 
implement customary international law also limits such legislation by 
 
14  See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012). 
15  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
16  Id. 
17  See Dire, 680 F.3d at 454–55 (citing Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and 
the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 149, 164–67 (2009) (link)). 
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customary international law. There is evidence for this not just in the 
structure of the clause, but also in grand jury instructions of Justices Wilson 
and Story, the pronouncements of Chief Justice John Marshall, and 
important judicial and Congressional precedents from the early Republic. 
For example, in United States v. Furlong, the Supreme Court in 1820 found 
that a statute that purported to punish “murder” by “any person” on the high 
seas did not apply universally because it was not a universal jurisdiction 
crime.18 
Because murder was not universally cognizable, such an “offence 
committed by a foreigner upon a foreigner in a foreign ship” is a matter in 
which “Congress . . . ha[s] no right to interfere.”19 The Court suggested this 
limitation was constitutional, noting that universal jurisdiction would 
exceed “the punishing powers of the body that enacted it”20—that is, the 
regulation would go beyond the Define and Punish Clause. As John 
Marshall put it in on the House floor in 1800: “[T]he people of the United 
States have no jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a foreign ship 
against a foreign nation. Of consequence, in framing a Government for 
themselves, they cannot have passed this jurisdiction to that Government.”21 
The presumption against extraterritoriality is normally a matter of 
reconstructing legislative intent. But when extraterritoriality rises to the 
level of universality, it raises constitutional questions about Congress’s 
power to regulate such conduct in the first place. Drawing on another 
canon—constitutional avoidance—universal jurisdiction should not be 
exercised except over the mostly clearly established universal jurisdiction 
offenses. 
This is particularly true in ATS cases, where Congress has failed to 
exercise its power to “define.” That word was included in the Constitution 
because international law was thought to be too “vague and deficient” to 
provide a judicially administrable rule.22 In other words, not only is it often 
hard to determine what international law is, but it can also come down to a 
political judgment. Flesh must be put on the bones of international law 
before it can be the basis for liability in American courts. In the ATS, 
Congress passed the job given to it by the Constitution to the courts. 
 
2. Promiscuous Universal Jurisdiction in the ATS 
U.S. courts cannot get creative in defining the contours of international 
offenses. Congress does not have unlimited license to “define” offenses 
 
18  18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820) (link); see also Kontorovich, supra note 17, at 174—83 
(discussing and documenting early views of Justices Wilson, Story, and Marshall). 
19  Furlong, 18 U.S. at 197, 198. 
20  Id. at 196. 
21  United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 865 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) (link). 
22  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 614–15 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(link). 
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beyond what international law has established. When Congress delegates 
this power to the courts, the latter have even less latitude for creativity lest 
they raise non-delegation concerns.23 Thus, courts must stick very closely to 
well-established international precedents.24 The Supreme Court recently 
made this point in the war crimes context.25 Yet in the ATS context, courts 
typically apply universal jurisdiction (UJ) without any examination of 
whether the relevant conduct is treated as universally cognizable by the law 
of nations. The list of universal jurisdiction offenses that is generally agreed 
upon is quite short, and therefore should be easy to check. Thus, The 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
concludes that, even with the “expanding class of universal offenses,” that 
status only attaches to “piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of 
aircraft, genocide, [and] war crimes.”26 Another oft-cited enumeration, The 
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, also add crimes against 
peace, crimes against humanity, and torture.27 
Yet courts in ATS cases have extended UJ to norms that are not 
generally regarded as universally cognizable, such as apartheid,28 wartime 
property confiscation,29 forced labor,30 and child labor.31 These cases do not 
even make token efforts to establish that the norms were subject to 
universal jurisdiction, and often make no distinction between American and 
foreign co-defendants. The piracy precedent, for all it is worth, does not 
justify, and indeed contradicts, such across-the-board universal 
extraterritoriality—instead, piracy only supports universality for offenses 
that have clearly achieved that status in international law. Courts have been 
delegated the power to “define” international law in ATS cases, but this 
definition cannot be inconsistent with, or in anticipation of, well-established 
international law.32 
 
23  Congressional delegations must be cabined by some “intelligible principle” which by definition is 
narrower than Congress’s Article I power. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 
409 (1928) (link). 
24  See Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and Defining in the Constitution’s Law of 
Nations Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
25  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 611–12 (2006) (plurality opinion) (holding that “conspiracy” 
to commit war crimes is not a violation of international law and thus could not be punished under 
commissions convened under the Offenses Clause) (link). 
26  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 & cmt. a 
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (link). 
27  PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 23 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) (link). 
28  See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (dicta); In re S. African Apartheid 
Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (link); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at § 404, 
reporter’s note 1 (noting that a treaty to assign UJ status to apartheid has not received the assent of most 
nations, including the U.S.). 
29  See Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (link). 
30  See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (link). 
31  See id. at 1075. 
32  See Kontorovich, supra note 24. 
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Justice Ginsburg has suggested that Sosa approved extraterritoriality 
by favorably citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a universal jurisdiction case.33 
Indeed, Sosa quoted Filartiga’s famous analogy between modern human 
rights universal jurisdiction and its precursors: “[T]he torturer has 
become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani 
generis, an enemy of all mankind.”34 Yet, this is hardly decisive. Again, 
Sosa was not a universal jurisdiction case, so the issue was not before the 
Court. Moreover, it could be that the ATS allows universal jurisdiction for a 
few norms like torture that are generally considered to have that status in 
international law, but not for others. 
 
II. PIRATICAL PRESUMPTIONS 
A. The Exceptionality of Piracy 
ATS cases like Kiobel involve entirely foreign conduct and thus, put 
into play the canon of statutory construction against extraterritorial 
application.35 The Supreme Court recently reasserted this presumption with 
respect to other statutes in the face of decades of contrary lower court 
practice.36 However, the presumption is not absolute. Thus, some courts 
have argued that if there was ever a place for not applying the canon, it 
would be in a statute about the “law of nations.” Piracy was an offense that 
by definition could only take place outside the territory of the U.S. Since 
piracy is presumably actionable under the ATS, some courts have reasoned 
that the extraterritoriality canon is inapplicable.37 
Again, cases like Kiobel raise issues not just of extraterritoriality but of 
universality. Universal jurisdiction cases go far beyond what is implicated 
by the standard territoriality presumption because the latter doctrine applies 
to statutes designed to regulate American interests. Thus, even if one thinks 
statutes concerning international law could be more easily found to apply 
 
33  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14. 
34  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). 
35  Though often traced to The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 
(1812) (link), that case turned largely on principles of international law. The longstanding modern canon 
appears to be independent from the Schooner Exchange rule and is not concerned with potential 
conflicts with foreign laws. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878–939 (2010). 
36  See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–939. 
37  See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Exxon posits a novel form of 
the canon, for it appears beyond debate that piracy is contemplated by the ATS, and piracy can occur 
outside of the territorial bounds of the United States.” (citations omitted)) (link); id. at 78 (Kavanaugh, 
J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority on this point). Judge Kavanaugh attempts to distinguish high seas 
extraterritoriality from “foreign country” extraterritoriality. But since vessels on the high seas fall within 
the jurisdiction of their flag state, adjudicating crimes on foreign vessels raises the same issues of 
interference with other countries as crimes within foreign borders. 
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extraterritorially, reading universal jurisdiction into a statute is another 
matter altogether.38 
Moreover, it is not clear that Sosa was right about Congress’s belief 
that the ATS would be a vehicle for piracy suits. Although piracy was one 
of the three offenses incorporated into common law, it stood on very 
different remedial footing than the other two. Civil remedies against pirates 
were almost exclusively in rem. While damages actions were possible, it is 
hard to find any evidence of such suits, and they would likely have been far 
too marginal to command Congress’s solicitude. Moreover, piracy by a 
U.S. vessel would, in an important sense, not be extraterritorial because a 
ship on the high seas is fully within the territorial jurisdiction of its flag 
state. Finally, while piracy took place by definition outside the borders of 
the U.S., violations of safe conduct, another of the ATS’s three historical 
paradigms, were by definition strictly territorial. It is hard to see why one 
would model ATS territoriality on the former and not the latter, especially 
for causes of action that do not necessarily arise extraterritorially. Piracy 
was understood as a unique offense in international law when the ATS was 
passed. Even if the ATS applied to it, this demonstrates that Congress 
would want to discard extraterritoriality presumptions for other offenses. 
 
B. Presumption Still Applies to International Crimes 
The fact that a statute deals with matters of international law does not 
mean it automatically triggers universal jurisdiction or suspends 
presumptions against extraterritoriality. For example, in United States v. 
Palmer, Chief Justice Marshall read a statute criminalizing “piracy” by 
“any person” as requiring a U.S. nexus, even though it was clear that 
Congress could constitutionally apply the statute universally.39 To be sure, 
Congress quickly overrode the Palmer construction, at least partially, and 
Justice Marshall appears to have gotten it wrong as a matter of 
congressional intent (though not necessarily as a textual matter).40 Yet 
Congress’s response to Palmer does not disprove the existence of the 
presumption as applied to international law offenses. Presumptions are 
generalizations about congressional intent. Those generalizations are, of 
course, sometimes wrong, and in those cases Congress can say so. 
A presumption is only valuable if it is usually right. The anti-
extraterritoriality rule stops making sense if one thinks that by invoking 
international law terms, or at least universal jurisdiction offenses, Congress 
usually intends to use the full extent of the jurisdiction allowed to it by 
 
38  Federal courts have found universal extraterritoriality only in the face of the clearest statement of 
congressional intent. See, e.g., Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. § 70503(b) 
(2012) (link). 
39  16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 610 (1818) (link). 
40  See Colangelo, supra note 7, at 1063–65. 
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international law.41 Congress’s critical reaction to Palmer aside, the 
evidence goes in the opposite direction. Recent federal statutes do not 
extend universal jurisdiction to war crimes but do apply it to torture (in both 
cases making the foreign application clear) though both are universal 
jurisdiction offenses in international law.42 Indeed, in the 1820s, the Navy 
Department was instructing warships to only interfere with pirates attacking 
U.S. ships.43 Today, the stated policy of almost all nations, including the 
U.S., is to avoid any exercise of universal jurisdiction over piracy.44 Indeed, 
most nations do not have laws against most universal jurisdiction offenses 
(leaving aside the question of civil remedies). In short, the universal 
cognoscibility of an offense is relevant to Congress’s constitutional ability 
to regulate it but not necessarily relevant to whether that power has been 
maximally exercised. 
The ATS was passed by the very same Congress that authored the 
piracy law at issue in Palmer. If the presumption applied to an anti-piracy 
law, one would think a court would apply it equally to sister statutes dealing 
with law of nations violations. On the other hand, if presumptions have 
validity because Congress knowingly treats them as background rules,45 
they would have less bite with the legislation of the First Congress, which 
had not yet considered the presumption. 
Justice Ginsburg has suggested that the Supreme Court implicitly 
approved of ATS extraterritoriality in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.46 But Sosa 
involved “simple” extraterritoriality—and did not raise foreign-cubed 
issues—because it involved U.S. federal agents and their local contractors 
abducting a Mexican national (who had been involved in the torture and 
murder of a U.S. federal agent) so that he could stand trial in the U.S. Few 
cases could have a tighter U.S. nexus. 
Reading a U.S. territorial or other nexus requirement into the statute is 
consistent with its purpose. The statute was designed to give an avenue of 
redress to aliens aggrieved by law of nations violations for which the U.S. 
might be held responsible by foreign powers. The ATS’s reference to 
international law does not untether it from American interests. Consider by 
analogy Article III’s Ambassadors Clause.47 This clause provides that the 
 
41  See id. at 1074–75. 
42  See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (link). 
43  One might think different presumptions should apply to criminal and civil statutes. In the case of 
pirates, for example, civil remedies against foreign pirates would only be available after the Executive 
had decided to engage in enforcement action. 
44  See Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for 
Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 326 (2010) (link). 
45  See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010) (“[T]he 
presumption . . . preserv[es] a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable 
effects.”). 
46  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
47  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Supreme Court will have original jurisdiction over suits involving 
ambassadors and does not textually limit the class of ambassadors involved. 
Yet when a U.S. Ambassador—that is, an emissary from Washington—
sought a trial before the Court, he was dismissed out of hand in one short 
paragraph.48 The Ambassadors Clause (or perhaps just the similarly worded 
statute conferring the jurisdiction) only applies to foreign ambassadors 
because that is the purpose of the jurisdiction: to avoid offending other 
countries.49 
One might suggest that the policies behind the anti-extraterritorial 
presumption, such as avoiding conflicts with foreign laws, do not apply to 
the ATS. Under the ATS, it is international law that is to be applied. This is 
the same everywhere—what can be the conflict? First, the definition of 
international law is “vague,” varying from one nation to another; this is why 
the Framers made Congress “define” it. To pretend that different national 
conceptions of international law cannot conflict comes close to the 
discarded pretense that the several states apply a single common law, with 
perceived conflicts being a mere epiphenomenon.50 Second, international 
law is silent as to the method of its enforcement, particularly on the 
question of penalties. With the exception of the U.S., no country has civil 
remedies for extraterritorial torts, and several have filed briefs protesting 
such litigation under the ATS. Certainly the punitive damages conflict with 
other legal regimes comes not just from penalizing what they choose to 
legalize but also from penalizing to different degrees. Different degrees of 
penalty can create substantive inconsistency, as the Supreme Court recently 
noted in ruling on federal preemption of Arizona’s immigration laws.51 In a 
further irony, the Kiobel plaintiffs argue that ATS cases should not be 
governed purely by international law but that the Court should borrow 
important rules of decision—such as corporate liability—from U.S. 
domestic law. 
Palmer may reflect a presumption distinct from but related to the 
extraterritoriality one: a presumption against universality. The assumption 
is that Congress legislates selfishly, to vindicate parochial American 
interests, rather than for the sake of cosmopolitan justice. This approach is 
well illustrated by directives issued by Secretary of the Navy Smith 
Thompson in 1823 to a naval squadron sent to the Caribbean to suppress 
what turned out to be the last great wave of international piracy in the Age 
of Sail: 
From the generality of [the statute], it would seem to 
embrace those of every nation or country upon which any 
 
48  See Ex parte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302 (1925) (link). 
49  Id. at 303. 
50  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (link). 
51  See Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, slip op. at 12–15 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (holding that 
“additional penalties” for violation of same substantive law creates direct conflict) (link). 
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piratical aggressions may have been committed. Admitting 
the act might be extended this far, it does not appear to 
have been the general object of the law; and it is thought by 
the President most advisable, at present, not to give it a like 
indiscriminate practical construction as to all vessels. The 
great object [of the statute] . . . was to protect the merchant 
vessels of the United States and their crews from piratical 
aggressions . . . . 
 
If, however, you shall discover depredations upon other 
vessels, committed under such gross and aggravated 
circumstances, as to leave little doubt of the piratical 
character, it will be your duty to capture and bring in the 
aggressors . . . . No authority is given to retake the vessels 
of any foreign nation.52 
 
These instructions refer to the piracy statute after Congress had 
amended it to allow for universal jurisdiction, in response to the Supreme 
Court’s Palmer decision. Yet the Executive effectively rules out universal 
jurisdiction. The instructions suggest several important points for the ATS. 
First, universal jurisdiction, even for piracy, was regarded as extraordinary, 
and those interpreting the statute continued to apply a narrow construction 
based on the basic principle that U.S. laws are primarily concerned with 
U.S. interests. Obviously, one can quibble about the interpretive value of 
naval orders. But these were self-conscious, executive interpretations of a 
statute, authored by a cabinet secretary (and subsequently a Justice on the 
Supreme Court)—Smith Thompson. The case for extraterritorial application 
of the ATS places extraordinary weight on a single sentence in a 
memorandum by the Attorney General. Together, the two executive branch 
interpretations point the same way—a requirement of some U.S. nexus. 
The orders do suggest that under “aggravated circumstances” universal 
jurisdiction could be exercised for crimes that undoubtedly had that status 
under international law, though the instructions are ambiguous on this point 
(and could also be read to forbid the capture of pirates attacking foreign 
ships from non-U.S. vessels, which would rule out all universal 
jurisdiction). At a minimum, the Executive raised the bar significantly 
beyond what was required in international law. Indeed, the instructions 
show that the Executive played a crucial gate-keeping role in universal 
jurisdiction over piracy. Because even civil remedies against pirates were in 
rem, they could only be enjoyed in the rare cases where the Executive had 
authorized a capture and decided to bring the vessel in for adjudication (for 
 
52  2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS 211–12 (Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney eds., 
Washington, Gales & Seaton, 1860) (link). 
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reasons of convenience, they were often burned at sea or turned over to 
local authorities). 
 
III. PIRATES, INC. 
While corporations can routinely be held liable under U.S. domestic 
law, it is far from clear that the law of nations creates similar liability. 
Indeed, it is hard to identify any cases in which corporations have been held 
liable for violating the law of nations outside the ATS context. Because 
pirates were engaged in a multi-person profit-making enterprise—a 
business of sorts—piracy has been invoked as a precedent for corporate 
liability in international law and, given Sosa, one that should be near and 
dear to the ATS.53 
Yet, while piracy law does not disprove the possibility of corporate 
liability, neither is it an example or precedent for its existence, even by way 
of analogy. First, the civil remedy against pirates was the condemnation of 
their vessel, an in rem proceeding in admiralty. Second, the pirates were not 
a share corporation. Typically, pirates owned their vessel jointly. The 
organization of a pirate vessel was essentially a partnership—with elected 
officers—rather than a share corporation. There was no separation of 
ownership from control, the central characteristic of the modern public 
corporation.54 Consequently, the condemnation of the vessel simply 
operated as a fine against the principals, those who had directly violated 
international law. Modern corporate liability, by contrast, seeks to impose 
costs on diffuse absentee shareholders, who do not exercise direct control 
over the international law violations of their corporate agents. In rem 
proceedings against pirates, therefore, were more analogous to in personam 
actions against corporate directors or officers responsible for the tort than 
against their employer. 
The in rem nature of the proceedings is crucial. The purpose of such a 
proceeding was primarily to determine the legal rights in the vessel, not to 
provide compensation to victims of piracy. Thus, if the pirates had 
originally pirated the vessel they sailed on—as was often the case—the libel 
would serve to restore it to its owners (minus a claim for salvage by the 
captor) and nothing more. Moreover, the proceeds of a condemnation 
would be used to pay the captor. In rem jurisdiction therefore was a way of 
privately financing the dangerous and under-supplied service of actually 
apprehending pirates. Crucially, victims of the pirates from other vessels 
could not make any claim for condemnation. 
Justice Breyer, Judge Leval, and others have speculated about what 
would happen if pirates incorporated. Would “Pirates, Inc.” be shielded 
 
53  See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011) (link). 
54  See PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF PIRATES 37–42 (2009). 
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from liability? To be sure, because jurisdiction was in rem, the identity of 
the owner did not matter. But ATS cases pose a different question: Could 
Pirates, Inc. be pursued for damages separate from the libel of their vessel 
and tort suits against individual pirates? The practice of condemning pirate 
vessels does not serve as any precedent for an affirmative answer.55 
The closest precedent involved a vessel that had not gone on a 
premeditated piratical cruise, but nonetheless engaged in opportunistic acts 
of piracy during an otherwise legitimate journey, unbeknownst to the 
vessel’s owner. Justice Story found that the innocence and ignorance of the 
absentee owner was no defense to the in rem condemnation of his vessel56 
but also made clear that this was a particular doctrine of admiralty, not one 
of tort damages.57 Indeed, the condemnation would not extend to the cargo 
if its owners did not direct the piratical offense. Yet, in many ways it is the 
cargo owners who are the ultimate “bosses” of the journey—they hire the 
ship from an owner, who hires a master, who ultimately hires a crew. 
Indeed, Justice Story suggested the immunity of the innocent cargo owners 
would persist even if the master of the pirate ship was their direct agent, or 
if they also owned the vessel itself.58 
Justice Story made clear that the forfeiture in rem, despite the owner’s 
innocence, was necessary to ensure effective compensation to victims.59 
Supporters of corporate ATS liability make arguments with a superficially 
similar tone—without forfeiture in rem, victims have no remedy and 
offenders no deterrence. Yet the policy behind in rem jurisdiction was not 
about going after the deepest pocket. Rather, the “necessity” came from the 
difficulty foreign plaintiffs faced in obtaining personal jurisdiction over 
ship owners or even identifying them. Indeed, far from guaranteeing 
compensation to all victims, in rem proceedings capped recovery at the 
value of the vessel minus salvage and admiralty fees, leaving absent 
claimants with nothing. Today, damages actions are available against the 
 
55  By an amazing coincidence, another ATS case pending in the federal courts gives a potential 
example of incorporated “pirates.” The case involves a suit by Japanese whalers against a Washington-
based environmentalist group famous for using boats to obstruct whaling on the high seas. The whalers 
said the hazardous tactics of Sea Shepherd amounted to “acts of violence or depredation” and thus 
constitute piracy under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The 
defendant group is incorporated as a non-profit, and there is not the kind of separation of ownership and 
control found in share corporations. Illustrating the distinction from typical corporate cases, the group’s 
founder and director also captains its vessels and was named as a co-defendant. The defendants have not 
raised the corporate liability issue, perhaps because the plaintiffs have only sought equitable relief. 
Moreover, the district court surprisingly held that Sea Shepherd’s conduct could not be piracy because it 
was not committed for “private ends” as required by UNCLOS because it “is uninterested in financial 
gain” and only wants to “save the . . . whales.” Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation 
Soc’y, No. C11–2043RAJ, 2012 WL 958545, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 2012). 
56  The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 234 (1844) (link).  
57  Id. at 232. 
58  Id. at 236–37. 
59  Id. at 232. 
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responsible corporate officers and agents, and personal jurisdiction is much 
broader. 
The notion of Pirates, Inc. expresses an intuitive incredulity that 
investors in pirate ventures—and these exist today—could avoid liability. 
Yet this question is inapposite to ATS corporate liability in two ways. First, 
such investors are, at best, only liable under international law if they 
“intentionally facilitated” the actus reus of piracy.60 The requirement of 
actual “intent” itself suggests a limitation of liability to individuals. 
Moreover, the investors in Pirates, Inc. are acting solely with the purpose 
and knowledge of funding a violation of international law. This is quite 
unlike the shareholders of the multinational corporations in ATS cases. In 
short, the pirate financiers are also the ringleaders; they are putting up 
money specifically to commit acts of piracy. 
Second, it remains entirely unclear if absentee investors in pirate 
ventures, whether incorporated or not, are liable under international law. 
The natural reading of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea is that it only applies to facilitators on the high seas, and not land-based 
accomplices.61 To be sure, national laws have long provided criminal 
punishment for land-based accomplices, but this supplements, rather than 
implements, the law of nations. For example, federal piracy statutes have 
long treated land-based assistance to pirates as a separate offense—
”confederating with pirates”—distinct from “piracy as defined by the law of 
nations.”62 Fitting out pirates is not defined as piracy and carries a much 
lighter penalty. Moreover, when national law is used to augment 
international law crimes, universal jurisdiction is not available since it can 
only be created by the law of nations. 
It is neither odd nor perverse that the law of nations would not 
necessarily reach Pirates, Inc. Captured pirates face criminal punishment, 
which was death until the twentieth century, and in the U.S remains life in 
prison. This is a serious deterrent and one that it is not surprising 
international law has not needed to supplement. Moreover, piracy is a 
universal jurisdiction offense. Universal jurisdiction is made possible by the 
narrow scope of the offense—conduct on the high seas. It is not surprising 
that the definition of the offense does not extend to land-based investors; 
the international consensus on treating piracy as a universal offense might 
well not be tenable if it included conduct purely within the sovereign 
territory of a single state. 
 
 
60  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101(c), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397, 436 (link). 
61  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 86, supra note 60, at 432. 
62  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1657, 1651 (2012) (link). 
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CONCLUSION 
Piracy is the oldest and most well-established international offense. 
Thus, it is not surprising that questions about the extraterritorial scope and 
availability of corporate liability under the ATS look to piracy as a 
paradigm. Yet many have taken away the wrong lessons. The Constitution 
does permit extraterritorial—indeed, universal—jurisdiction over piracy. 
But it does not do so for all “Offenses against the Law of Nations.” Indeed, 
the broader jurisdictional scope for piracy is the primary reason it is 
mentioned separately in the Constitution. At most, the Constitution only 
allows foreign-cubed suits for offenses that have the same international 
status as piracy, but courts in ATS cases have skipped this crucial first step. 
Moreover, even if one accepts Sosa’s dictum—the ATS was intended to 
apply to piracy—this does not mean it was intended to extend the 
constitutional maximum scope of jurisdiction. For one, other 
contemporaneous piracy laws did not apply to foreign-cubed cases. 
Additionally, other contemporaneous jurisdictional statutes did not confer 
the constitutional maximum jurisdiction even when they echoed the 
relevant constitutional language. 
Nor does the international legal status of piracy provide a precedent for 
the liability of modern share corporations. Pirate syndicates were 
partnerships with no separation of ownership and control. In rem 
condemnation of a vessel is different in crucial ways from money damages, 
perhaps most significantly in the inherent limitation of the extent of 
liability. 
